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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code section 78A-3- l 02(3 )U). The Utah Supreme Court transferred this appeal to the 
Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, thereby 
conferring jurisdiction on this Court pursuant to Utah Code section 78a-4- l 03(2)U). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether Mrs. Baker's due process rights were violated and the trial court 
exceeded its discretion in denying relief from default judgment where Mrs. Baker was 
served by publication despite there being other, more reliable means of service available 
that would have easily informed her of the pending action. 
Standard of Review: Whether a trial court properly ruled on a motion for relief from 
judgment under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. Frito-Lay v. Utah Labor Comm 'n, 2009 UT 71, 22 n. 29,222 P.3d 55 (quoting 
Men::.ies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ~ 54, 150 P .3d 480)) C'[ A] district court should exercise its 
discretion in favor of granting relief so that controversies can be decided on the merits rather 
than on technicalities."). 
Preservation of Issue: Mrs. Baker preserved this issue below. R. 129-131; 226--230. 
2. Whether the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying relief from 
default judgment where the default judgment awarded contractual attorney fees in the 
absence of a contract between the parties. 
Standard of Review: Whether a trial court properly ruled on a motion for relief from 
judgment under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. Frito-Lay v. Utah Labor Comm 'n, 2009 UT 71, 22 n. 29,222 P.3d 55 (quoting 
Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ii 54, 150 P.3d 480)) ("[A] district court should exercise its 
discretion in favor of granting relief so that controversies can be decided on the merits rather 
than on technicalities."). 
Preservation of Issue: Mrs. Baker preserved this issue below. R. 230. 
3. Whether the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying relief from 
default judgment where Mrs. Baker was entitled under controlling precedent to have 
the judgment set aside. 
Standard of Review: Whether a trial court properly ruled on a motion for relief from 
judgment under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. Frito-Lay v. Utah Labor Comm 'n, 2009 UT 71, 22 n. 29, 222 P.3d 55 (quoting 
Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, 154, 150 P.3d 480)) ("[A] district court should exercise its 
discretion in favor of granting relief so that controversies can be decided on the merits rather 
than on technicalities."). 
Preservation of Issue: Mrs. Baker preserved this issue below. R. 228-230. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The following rule excerpt and statute are detenninative or of central importance to 
the issues raised in this appeal: 
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Relief from Judgment or Order 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; 
fraud, etc. On motion and upon just terms, the court may relieve a party or its 
legal representative from a judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: 
(b )( 1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 
(b )(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been 
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b ); 
(b )(3) fraud ( whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an opposing party; 
(b )( 4) the judgment is void; 
(b )(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or vacated, or it is no 
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; 
or(b )( 6) any other reason that justifies relief. 
( c) Timing and effect of the motion. A motion under paragraph (b) must be 
filed within a reasonable time and for reasons in paragraph (b )( 1 ), (2), or (3 ), 
not more than 90 days after entry of the judgment or order or, if there is no 
judgment or order, from the date of the proceeding. The motion does not affect 
the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) and (c) 
Partial interest tax sales 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) "Tax sale interest purchaser" means an owner of an undivided interest in 
a parcel of tax sale property that bid for and purchased the undivided interest: 
(i) at a tax sale in accordance with Section 59-2-1351.1; 
(ii) on or after July 1, 2007; and 
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(iii) if the undivided interest in the tax sale property equals 49% or less. 
(b) "Tax sale property" means a parcel of real property that was sold in part as 
an undivided interest at a tax sale in accordance with Section 59-2-1351.1. 
(2) If a parcel of tax sale property is sold, a tax sale interest purchaser may 
only receive from the sale of the tax sale property, an amount equal to the 
greater of: 
(a) the amount the tax sale interest purchaser paid for the undivided interest in 
the tax sale property at the tax sale plus 12% interest; or 
(b) the tax sale interest purchaser's pro rata share of the sale price of the tax 
sale property based on the percentage of the undivided interest the tax sale 
interest purchaser holds in the tax sale property. 
(3) A tax sale interest purchaser may not object to the sale of the tax sale 
property if the tax sale interest purchaser receives an amount in accordance 
with Subsection (2). 
Utah Code § 59-2-1351. 7 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case. 
This appeal concerns circumstances that amount to an abuse of discretion when a trial 
court denies a motion for relief from a default judgment under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. It also concerns the rights of persons who purchases property at a tax 
sale. Specifically, the case concerns (I) whether the trial court properly ordered 
Plaintiff/ Appellee C504 750P, LLC ("Plaintiff') to serve Defendant/ Appellant Staci Baker 
("Mrs. Baker") by publication when Plaintiff knew how to get in touch with Mrs. Baker 
through both an email address and a physical address; (2) whether the trial court properly 
awarded Plaintiff its attorney fees pursuant to a contract to which Mrs. Baker was not a party; 
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and (3) whether the tenn "sale" as used in Utah Code section 59-2-1351.7 should be 
interpreted to mean only a legitimate arm's length transaction between disinterested parties 
as opposed to a sham transaction with a family member at a fraction of the property's fair 
market value designed to deprive a "tax sale interest purchaser" the benefit of her bargain. 
II. The Course of Proceedings. 
Plaintiff filed a quiet title action against Mrs. Baker on August 28, 2014. R. 1-41. 
After several unsuccessful attempts to serve Mrs. Baker with process, 1 the trial court ordered 
that Plaintiff could serve the complaint on Mrs. Baker by publication. R. 61-62. When Mrs. 
Baker did not file an answer after service by publication was effected, the trial court granted 
Plaintiff defaultjudgment. R. 95-100. When Mrs. Baker learned of the defaultjudgment, 
and correspondingly, the complaint, she filed a motion pursuant to rule 60(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure to have the judgment set aside. 
III. Disposition in the Trial Court. 
The trial court denied Mrs. Baker's motion to set aside the default judgment. 
IV. Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issue Presented. 
I. Mrs. Baker paid $5,070.07 for a 40 percent undivided interest in a parcel of 
property at a tax sale pursuant to Utah Code section 59-2-1351.1 on or about July 31, 2013 
(the "'Property"). R. 126 at 1 8; R. 142. 
1 As Mr. Baker testified below, "During September 2014, Mrs. Baker was 5 months 
pregnant with twins and was often not home, as she was dealing with pregnancy 
complications and spent a lot of time staying at other family member's homes in order to 
receive their help and care." R. 286 at 19. 
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2. The Property was owned by C 161 P, LLC ("C 161 P"), which continued to own 
60 percent of the Property after the tax sale. R. 126-27 at ,I,I 9-10. fiv 
3. On June 1, 2014, C 161 P purportedly entered into a real estate purchase contract 
("REPC") to sale the Property to Plaintiff, C504750P, LLC, for $15,000. R. 127 at ,I 11. 
4. The Property has been appraised at $124,000, more than eight times the sales 
pnce. R. 127 at ,I 12. 
5. Seller, C 161 P, was an expired Utah limited liability company at the time of the 
sale whose registered agent was Elizabeth Collings, and whose managers were Elizabeth 
Collings and Timothy Collings. R. 126 at ,I,I 3 and 5. 
6. Plaintiff and purchaser, C504750P, LLC, is a Utah limited liability company 
whose registered agent is Howard Collings. R. 126 ,I 4. 
7. It was alleged below that Elizabeth and Timothy Collings are husband and 
wife, and that Howard Collings is Timothy Collings's father. R. 126 at ,I~ 6-7. 
8. A couple months after entering into the REPC, on July 25, 2014, Mrs. Baker 
received a letter via certified mail from Stephen Quesenberry of Durham, Jones & 
Pinegar-presumably on behalf of the Collingsez-asking her to attend a closing and sign ~ 
a quit claim deed for her interest in the Property in exchange for 40% of the $15,000 sales 
pnce. R. 3 at ~,I 12-13; R. 206-07. 
9. Mrs. Baker's husband, Matt Baker, responded to the letter via email on July 
31, 2014 to inform Mr. Quesenberry that Mrs. Baker would not cooperate with the proposed 
sale of the Property for $15,000. Mr. Baker explained: 
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I am quite confident that the 'sale' referenced in the tax sale statute was never 
intended to refer to a process in which the original owner who had lost interest 
in the property was able to cheat the tax sale interest purchaser out of their 
[sic] statutorily defined return by selling the property to a related party in a 
non-arm's length transaction and at a very steep discount from fair market 
value. Furthermore, I am strongly convinced you would have a difficult time 
selling that interpretation to a judge. If you would like to put the property up 
for sale and sell it at fair market value then I would not oppose the sale. Unless 
and until such time, I oppose the sale and will not cooperate with it. However, 
if Mr [sic] Collings believes his 'sale' represents the property's fair value, then 
I would happily agree to purchase the property for $15,100 and buy Mr. 
Collings out of his interest. 
R. 3 at ,I 14; R. 222-23. 
10. Subsequently, Plaintiff placed the $15,000 purchase price into escrow and 
C 161 P/Elizabeth and Timothy Collings quit claimed their interest in the Property to Plaintiff. 
R. 3 at ,I,I 15-17. 
11. Plaintiff then sued Mrs. Baker to force her to sale her 40 percent interest in the 
Property to Plaintiff in exchange for her pro rata share of the purchase price, or $6,000. R. 
(@ 4-5 at ,r,r 20-30. 
12. After several unsuccessful attempts to serve Mrs. Baker with process, the trial 
court ordered that Plaintiff could serve the complaint on Mrs. Baker by publication in a 
newspaper of general circulation in Utah County as opposed to simply sending her the 
complaint and summons either by mail or email, both of which means had been successfully 
used by Plaintiffs counsel to communicate with Mrs. Baker prior to the filing of the 
complaint. R. 61-62. 
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13. When Mrs. Baker did not file an answer after service by publication was 
effected, the trial court granted Plaintiff default judgment on November 26, 2014 in a form 
of judgment prepared by Plaintiff and unaltered by the trial court. R. 95-100. 
14. The judgment included an award of attorney fees based on an attorney fees 
clause contained in the REPC between C 161 P/Elizabeth and Timothy Collings and Plaintiff, 
an agreement to which Mrs. Baker was not a party. R. 8-16; R. 98-99. 
15. Notice of the judgment was mailed directly to Mrs. Baker, not published in a 
section of the newspaper no one reads, with an Amended Notice of Quiet Title Judgment 
mailed to her on January 23, 2015. R. 101-117. 
16. Accordingly, Mrs. Baker received notice of the entry of the judgment, and 
thereafter immediately took action to find and retain legal counsel, who filed the Motion for 
Relief from Default Judgment on February 24, 2015. R. 287 at ,I 13; R. 121-23. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I. The trial erred in allowing Plaintiff to serve Mrs. Baker exclusively by 
publication, as controlling precedent recognizes that publication is "is not reasonably 
calculated to reach those who could easily be infonned by other means at hand." Because 
this deprived Mrs. Baker of her constitutional due process rights, the trial court exceeded its 
discretion in not affording Mrs. Baker relief under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure by setting aside the default judgment. 
2. The trial court erred in adopting without alternation Plaintiffs proposed order, 
which included an award of contractual attorney fees against Mrs. Baker, even though Mrs. 
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Baker is not a party to the contract on which the attorney fees award was based. The trial 
court exceeded its discretion in not setting aside the judgment after Mrs. Baker brought this 
error to its attention. 
3. The trial court exceeded its discretion by not setting aside the default judgment 
in light of multiple Utah Supreme Court and Court of Appeals cases holding that defendants 
are generally entitled to have default judgments set aside when a meritorious defense exists. 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court exceeded its discretion in refusing to set aside the default judgment 
entered against Mrs. Baker. Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure empowers 
judges in the interests of Justice to "relieve a party or its legal representative from a 
judgment" in a number of circumstances, including any "reason that justifies relief." Utah 
R. Civ. P. Rule 60(b). In elaborating on this rule, the Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
The rule "seeks to strike a delicate balance between two countervailing 
impulses: the desire to preserve the finality of judgments and the incessant 
command of the court's conscience that justice be done in light of all the 
facts." And, in fact, finality, ''standing alone, is unpersuasive in the 
interpretation of a provision whose whole purpose is to make an exception to 
finality." 
Kell v. State, 2012 UT 25, 16, 285 P .3d 1133, 113 7 ( quoting Cessna Fin. Co,p. v. Bielenberg 
Masomy Contracting, Inc., 715 F .2d 1442, 1444 (10th Cir. 1983 ); Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 
U.S. 524, 529 (2005)). 
With respect to default judgments, the Utah Supreme Court has reminded us that "[i]t 
is well established that 60(b) motions should be liberally granted because of the equitable 
nature of the rule. Therefore, a district court should exercise its discretion in favor of 
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granting relief so that controversies can be decided on the merits rather than on 
technicalities." Frito-Lay v. Utah Labor Comm 'n, 2009 UT 71, 22 n. 29, 222 P.3d 55 
( quoting Men::ies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, 54, 150 P .3d 480) ). 
As explained next, there were three compelling reasons in this case that called for 
Mrs. Baker's motion to be granted: (I) the trial court authorized service by a means that had 
almost no chance of actually infonning Mrs. Baker of the lawsuit; (2) the default judgment 
granted Plaintiff attorney fees prohibited by long-established law; and (3) Mrs. Baker had a 
meritorious defense to the complaint's sole cause of action. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING SERVICE BY PUBLICATION. 
There is nothing more fundamental to the American rule of law than the requirement 
that a party be given proper notice of a civil proceeding prior to being deprived of its rights 
or property. Indeed, this principle is embodied in both the Untied States and Utah 
Constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. V C4No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process oflaw."); Utah Const. art. I,§ 7 ("No person shall be deprived 
of life, liberty or property, without due process oflaw."). 
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that "[a]n elementary and 
fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality 
is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of 
the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 339 U.S. 306, 314 ( 1950). In this regard, the 
Court has assailed service by publication as a constitutionally impennissible means of service 
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when a person's place of residence is known or when there are other means available of 
serving the individual. In Mullane, a decision handed down more than 65 years ago, the 
Court discussed the fiction that service by publication actually apprises a person of court 
proceedings: 
It would be idle to pretend that publication alone as prescribed here, is a 
reliable means of acquainting interested parties of the fact that their rights are 
before the courts. It is not an accident that the greater number of cases 
reaching this Court on the question of adequacy of notice have been concerned 
with actions founded on process constructively served through local 
newspapers. Chance alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an 
advertisement in small type inserted in the back pages of a newspaper .... 
/d.at315. 
In light of this reality, the Court held that service by publication "is not reasonably 
calculated to reach those who could easily be informed by other means at hand," including 
specifically those parties in that case whose addresses were known and therefore could be 
reached by "ordinary mail." Id. at 318-19. In subsequent cases, the Court recognized that 
service by publication "is the method of notice least calculated to bring to a potential 
defendant's attention thependencyofjudicial proceedings." Boddiev. Connecticut, 40 I U.S. 
3 71, 3 82 ( 1971) ( citations omitted). 
Following this precedent, the Utah Supreme Court likewise long ago limited service 
by publication to persons who could not be served by any other means: "Even [ where 
alternative service is justified], however, publication is not a constitutionally acceptable 
means of notice of the pendency of litigation where "it is not reasonably calculated to reach 
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those who could easily be informed by other means at hand." Graham v. Sawaya, 632 P.2d 
851, 853-54 (Utah 1981 ). 
The relevance and appropriateness of these holdings is even greater today than it was 
decades ago, when the general public actually read newspapers. In today's world, where 
newspaper subscriptions have become something of a rarity, service by publication should 
never be employed except when there is absolutely no other means available of giving notice 
of court proceedings to a party. 
Despite this reality, despite this controlling precedent, and despite the fact that 
Plaintiff had previously communicated with Mrs. Baker both by email and regular mail (the 
very means by which notice of the default judgment would later be sent), the trial court 
authorized Plaintiff to serve Mrs. Baker by publication to the exclusion of all other methods 
of service that could have easily informed Mrs. Baker of the proceedings. As a result, Mrs. 
Baker was not notified of the proceedings and default judgment was allowed to enter against 
her. 
Consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's admonition to liberally grant rule 60(b) 
motions "so that controversies can be decided on the merits," and to correct the due process 
deficiencies in the notice method previously authorized, the trial court should have set aside 
the default judgment. Yet, inexplicably, it refused to do so. Given the fundamental 
constitutional rights at stake, it was an abuse of the trial court's discretion not to do so. This 
Court should reverse the trial court's decision so that due process may be afforded to Mrs. 
Baker and this controversy decided on its merits. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES. 
There was no basis on which the trial court could have permissibly awarded attorney 
fees in this case. "In general, Utah follows the traditional American rule that attorney fees 
cannot be recovered by a prevailing party unless a statute or contract authorizes such an 
award." Uta/ms For Better Dental Health-Davis, Inc. v. Davis County Clerk, 2007 UT 97, 
,I 5, 175 P.3d 1036. In this case, the trial court awarded fees to Plaintiff based on the REPC 
entered into between Plaintiff, the buyer of the Property, and C 161 P, the seller, at least of its 
60 percent share. R. 98-99. There were no other parties to the agreement. R. 8-16. 
It is axiomatic that a person is not bound by the terms of an agreement to which she 
is not a party. In short, there was no contractual basis on which to award attorney fees 
against Mrs. Baker. Nevertheless, the trial court adopted without the slightest change the 
order prepared by Plaintiffs counsel, which included such an attorney fees award. That the 
trial court refused to correct this glaring injustice when given the opportunity to do so, in 
addition to its refusal to remedy the constitutional infirmities of the prescribed method of 
service, underscores the abuse of discretion inherent in the trial court's order denying Mrs. 
Baker's rule 60(b) motion. 
III. MRS. BAKER WAS ENTITLED TO HA VE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SET 
ASIDE. 
Unlike the typical discretion allowed to trial courts to rule on 60(b) motions seeking 
relief from judgments entered after a case has been decided on its merits, a movant is 
generally entitled to have a judgment entered by default set aside under rule 60(b) where the 
movant has alleged a meritorious defense. The Utah Supreme Court and Court of Appeals 
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have repeatedly held: "Generally, 'a movant is entitled to have a default judgment set aside 
under [rule] 60(b) [of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure] if ( 1) the motion is timely; (2) there 
is a basis for granting relief under one of the subsections of 60(b ); and (3) the movant has 
alleged a meritorious defense." Aspenbrook Homeowners Ass 'n v. Dahl, 2014 UT App 99, 
,r 10, 329 P .3d 822, 826 cert. denied sub nom. Aspen brook v. Dahl, 33 7 P .3d 295 (Utah 2014) 
( citations omitted); see also Menzies, 2006 UT 81 at ,r 108 (holding defendant was "entitled 
to relief under rule 60(b )( 6)" inasmuch as he met "meritorious defense requirement"). 
A. Mrs. Baker's Motion Was Timely. 
There is no question in this case that Mrs. Baker's rule 60(b) motion was timely. The 
rule requires that a movant seek relief within 90 days for the reasons in paragraph (b )( 1 ), (2), 
or (3 ), or "within a reasonable time" for the reasons in all other paragraphs, including 
paragraph (b )( 6)-"any other reason that j us ti fies relief'-under which Mrs. Baker moved. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(c). The defaultjudgment was entered on November 26, 2014. R. 95-100. 
The Amended Notice of Quiet Title Judgment was mailed to Mrs. Baker on January 23, 
2015. R. 101-117. Just about a month after receiving the Amended Notice of Quiet Title 
Judgment, Mrs. Baker found and retained legal counsel, who filed for relief under rule 60(b) 
on February 24, 2015. The is certainly a reasonable time frame under the rule. E.g., 
Robinson v. Baggett, 2011 UT App 250, ,r 31, 263 P .3d 411 (Utah Ct. App. 2011) (holding 
motion was timely filed "approximately three months after [judgment] was entered); ~f 
Crane-Jenkins v. Mikarose, LLC, 2015 WL 7075152, No. 20140940-CA at,r,r 16-17 (Utah 
14 
Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2015) (holding motion not timely when filed I 97 days after receipt of 
notice of default judgment). 
B. Rule 60(b)(6) Provides Mrs. Baker with a Basis for Relief. 
There is a basis for granting relief under one of the subsections of 60(b ). Here, Mrs. 
Baker moved under 60(b)(6), allowing a motion for "any other reason that justifies relief." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). This is not a case where default entered against a defendant who 
failed to protect its rights after receiving notice of a complaint. Mrs. Baker never received 
actual notice of the complaint. Rather notice was only constructively given, contrary to 
controlling precedent, by publication, the least effective means known of apprising a 
defendant of a pending lawsuit. Boddie, 40 I U.S. at 382. If there were ever a reason 
justifying relief from a judgment under rule 60(b)(6), it would be to ensure a person's 
constitutional guarantee to due process was afforded to them. 
Not surprisingly, court's throughout the country deem judgments that are entered 
without due process of law to be void. First W. Bank o.f'Minot v. Wickman, 404 N.W. 2d 
195, 196 (N.D. 1990) ("A judgment entered on motion of one party without proper notice and 
the opportunity to be heard by the other party is contrary to fundamental principles of 
justice"); Metro Dade County v. Cuny, 632 So.2d 667, 668 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (per 
curiam) ("An order entered without notice or opportunity to be heard is a void order."); cf 
Utah State Employee Credit Union v. Riding, 469 P.2d I, 3 (Utah 1970) ("We think the 
motion to reconsider the motion to vacate the judgment is abortive under the rules, but even 
if it weren't, it was error under the rules to hear and act upon it without notice."). Rule 
15 
60(b)(6) is never more properly invoked than when it is invoked to remedy a deprivation of 
due process. ~ 
C. Mrs. Baker Has a Meritorious Defense. 
Mrs. Baker has a meritorious defense to Plaintiffs sole cause of action. "A defense 
is sufficiently meritorious to have a default judgment set aside if it is entitled to be tried." 
Id. at iJ 108 (quoting Erickson v. Schenkers Intern. Fonvarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1149 
(Utah 1994). Here, Plaintiffs sole claim sought the trial court to sanction a sham transaction 
that contravened the purpose of the tax sale statute. The trial court should have rejected this 
effort out of hand. 
Tax sales are an important means by which county governments can recover 
delinquent taxes from parties who otherwise refuse to pay the taxes they owe. In order to 
entice people to purchase tax sale properties, the legislature offers them certain protections, 
including a guaranteed minimum return on their investment. This is especially important, 
as most "tax sale interest purchasers," as they are referred to in the Code, purchase something 
less than a I 00 percent interest in a tax sale property. Thus, if the original owner (the 
delinquent taxpayer) decides to sell the property following the tax sale, the tax sale interest 
purchaser is entitled to the greater of a 12 percent return on its investment or its pro rata share 
of the sale price. Utah Code§ 59-2-1351. 7(2). The Code provides that "[a] tax sale interest 
purchaser may not object to the sale of the tax sale property if the tax sale interest purchaser 
receives an amount in accordance with Subsection (2)." Id. at § 59-2-1351. 7(3 ). 
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In this case, the delinquent taxpayer, C 161 P, did not engage in a legitimate arm's 
length sell of the property for its fair market value ( approximately $124,000) as contemplated 
by the statute. Instead, it reverse-engineered the sales price by detennining what the 
minimum sales price must be in order to prevent Mrs. Baker for objecting to what by all 
counts was a illegitimate sale. Mrs. Baker paid $5,070.07 for her interest in the property, so 
she was entitled to receive at least a $608.40 return in a subsequent sale. By setting the price 
at $15,000, Mrs. Baker's pro rata share would be $6,000 ($15,000 x .40), just enough to 
cover the $5,678.47 minimum. C 161 P/Elizabeth and Timothy Collings then found a 
party-Mr. Collings' s father-who would take the property at $15,000, presumably with a 
side deal to quitclaim the property right back to Mr. and Mrs. Collings or otherwise hold the 
property for the Collingsez' benefit. In this way, the Collingsez, with Mr. Collings's father 
as their accomplice, attempted to "launder" the property to cleanse the unwanted tax sale 
interest purchaser, Mrs. Baker, off of the title. 
Of course, this sham transaction undermines the protections set forth for tax sale 
interest purchasers in the statute and makes a mockery of the tenn "sale" as used by the 
statute. This Court should do what the trial court failed to do and reject Plaintiffs effort to 
abuse the statute in this way. As is well established: 
A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that statutes are to be construed 
according to their plain language .... A corollary of this rule is that "a 
statutory tenn should be interpreted and applied according to its usually 
accepted meaning, where the ordinary meaning of the term results in an 
application that is neither unreasonably confused, inoperable, nor in blatant 
contradiction of the express purpose of the statute." 
17 
State v. Bohne, 200 I UT App 11 , ~ 7, 18 P.3d 514, 516 ajf"d, (Utah 2002) 63 P.3d 63 (citing 
O'Keefe v. Utah State Retirement Bel. , 956 P.2d 279, 281 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted)). 
Certainly, the "usually accepted meaning" of the term "sale," does not include sham 
transactions in which property is sold for a fraction of its fair market value to a relative in 
order to cleanse an unwanted tenant in conrn1on from title and escape the consequences of 
not paying one's taxes. Rather, the legislature surely intended for the term "sale" to mean 
only a legitimate arm's length transaction between disinterested parties that would realize the 
property's true market value. 
Because Mrs. Baker had a meritorious defense to Plaintiffs sole cause of action, the 
trial court exceededd its discretion in refusing to give her relief pursuant to her timely filed 
rule 60(b) motion, especially where the means of service allowed for by the CoUI1 denied 
Mrs. Baker her due process rights, and where the default judgment improperly awarded 
attorney fees to Plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mrs. Baker respectfully requests that this Cou11 reverse the 
trial court's decision to deny relief to Mrs. Baker under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and remand thjs action to the trial court for further proceedings. 
DA TED this 4th day of April , 20 16. 
HOOLE & KING, L.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant/ Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
A-1 
Co1nplaint 
STEPIIE~ Ql'ESE~BERRY (8073) 
sqL11:-.;\!t1h\!IT~ 11 djpla,, .cnm 
~L\IBERLY \. H.\R~ES ( l-t5891 
h.harn\!s a d_jpla,, .cPm 
Dl.RH.-\:\1 .. JO\ES & Pl\£•:C.\R. P.C. 
Ri, \!rVi\!,, PLt1:1. Suit-: 300 
-lX-l-l :\,)rth 300 \\ .:,t 
Pr,,, 1). l 1.1h X-li>o-i-5<,(<~ 
I .:1-:phl>ll\!'. 8111-3 75-6()1)() 
L.1-:--irnik: XII 1-3 :5.3:,,1,5 
Attornc,s for Pbintiff 
I:\ rl II·. H >l RTI I .fl DICL\I DIS I Rll' IC<)( RI 
l I .\II ccw:--.1 Y. SL\ IL OI· l 1.\11 
C50-l 7511P. I.LC.. al ·tah limit\!d liahilit: 
c, ,n,pan:. 
Plaintiff. 
\ -;_ 
~ I .\Cl B.\1'.U{. an indi, idu;il. 
I k t"-:1h.Lll~l. 
fol Ill\\-.: 
("(),IPL.-\1 \T 
I Tier 2 I 
.I u.J:;-: 
PARTIES .. Jl"RISDICTIO\ . .-\\ll \"E\l'f. 
I. Plaintiff. C51l--l-750P. I.LC. is th\! alh:mpt-:d put'l.:hascr llr prup..:rt: llll.:at\!d in l ·tah 
CPtllll\ at 161 \\. i',Kilic [>r ... \111\!rican l·llrk. l l 8-l003. 
..., lkfrndant. Staci Baker. is them, ner of a -t-0° o undi, ided interest in real propert: 
k)c,1t .. :d at in L'tah Cuunt: at I() I \\'. Pi.Ki lie Dr.. ,.\merican hH·k. l 'tah 8-HlOJ. 
>. lh .. · Court lus .iurisdicti,H1 in this malt~r in aCCl)rdance \\ ith Utah Code Ann. 
~ 78. \-5-1 ()21 I ). 
-L \'1..'llll\..' is pn ,pl·r in thi-.; C()urt in accurdancl..' ,, ith l ·1ah Cude .\nn. ~ 78B-~-JO I. 
5. R.:1.1u.:-...t l~ir 1-..:lil..'t' is fur sp.:l·ilic pl..'rt:m11 .. 111c\..' and thus l1l'IHn,metar: relil..'f. 
making this a l'ier .2 casl..'. 
8.-\C~GROt~D F.-\CTS 
f). Dd~ndant is a .. ta.\ sak purchaser .. of a -H) 0 o undi \ ided inter~st in the r.:a I 
pn)p..:rt; I, 'C,ll..:d ~ll 161 \\ . PJl' i lie Dr ... \rncrican hH'". LT 8-t-1 )U3 ( hereinafter. .. thl· Prnpcrt) ··) 
pur-.,uant t.:i ,cct i1 ,n ~l)-~- 13 5 I . 7 , 1 r the l · tah Cudl·. (Lt.\ Dl..'ed att~1chl..'d a.-; Exhibit .-\.) 
31. 20 I., r,)r S5.o7o.o7. 
8. CI h I I'. l. L l' , '" 111.:d th\.' Propert) in ..:11t iri.:t, pri11r ld the ta.\ -...a k and the 
DcC.:ndant bu: ing hl·r int--·re'-l in th\.' Pn,p.:rt;. 
1> CI h 11'. L LC C( int inu.:d ll) , 1\\ n a 6011 11 und i, idi.:d int..:ri:...;l i 11 th~ Prop~:rt: a lkr thl· 
U.\. sak. a:,; t'f. and aftt.:r Jul: 31.2013. 
Io. Un Jun\.· I. 2() 1-L C50-t-75l)P. I.LC ~m\.·r~d intP a R~al Fsull: J>un.:has~ (\mtract 
(··Rr·:PC .. ) tt) purchas~ the Prtlpcrt) frlH11 ClblP.1.1.C t"ur Sl5.000. (RLPC and .-\dd~1h.la 
attacht.:d a'.') E\:hibit R.l 
I I. 
@ 
@ 
12. C50-l-750P. LLCs counsel sent a lt!tter \ia ct:rtified mail. dated Jul) 25. 201-L to 
the Deft!ndant a(h ising ha of the salt: of the Prnpert}. ( Lettt:r attached as Exhibit C.) 
13. This ktt\!r reqt1r:steJ h\!r ti.) attend dt1sing-pursuant to the REPC and st!ction 59-
2-1152. 7 nf the l ·tah CtH.k-and cum ey her inkre~t in the Prupert1 in ex.change for her share 
(-1-0°0) t,fthe purchase prke of the Propcrt> (all as set furth in sectinn 59-2-1352.7 of the l.'.tah 
Code). 
1-l-. Dd~ndanl sent an email nn Jul> 31.201-l-. ex.plaining that she \\OUld lll1l be 
attending the dnsing on tht: Pwpen~. and subsequent!) did not attt!nd the closing on the 
Property. ( Ema i I attached as Exhibit E.) 
15. C50-P50P. LLC tendered the S 15.000 purchase price into escro\\ prior to the date 
of c lt1~ing. 
16. A check \\a~ pn:pared for the Defendant prior h) the dnsing date. and \\as 
available at cln~ing. (Cop) of the Check attached ns Exhibit D.) 
I 7. C 161 P. LLC qu itdaimi.:d its 60° ,> inti.:rl!st in thi.: Property to C51J-I-750P. L LC. 
( Quitclaim d1.!1.!d from C 161 P. LLC atta~h~d as Exhibit F.) 
18. The closing. pursuant to Acklcndum No. 2 of the REPC. \\as unable to take place 
because th...: Dl!f~ndant rcfust:d to quitclaim h~r int~ri.:st in th...: Property to C50-l-750P. LLC 
pursuant tn sectil)l1 59-2-1351. 7 or the L'tah Code. ( Pn:pari.:d. but unsigned quitclaim de~d 
prepared from Staci Baker attachcu as Exhibit G.) 
.., 
_l 
19. Thus. the purchaser has been unable to finalize the purchas~ and the REPC 
r~quircmt:nls h~n·t: not been met. C 161 P. LLC has ful Iii led its requirements und~r the REPC by 
signing a cb:d cnm eying its interests in the subject property. 
FIRST C.-\liSE OF .-\CTION 
Specific Performance to Quitclaim Property pursuant to t·tah Code§ 59-2-1351.7 
20. Plaintiff i111.:orporat~s and rcalkg1:?s b) rcl~ren1.:e each L)fthe foregoing allegations. 
21. [kl~ndant is a tax sale interest purchasa of an undi,,idcd interest of less than -t-9~o 
of the Propert) that \\ as pun:haseJ in accorJance \\ ith section 59-2-135 l. l of the Utah Code. 
Del\.!nJant purchased her lax sale interest on July 31.2013. 
, .. 
-·'. Plaintiff entered int0 the REPC on .I une I. 201-l to pu rcht1se the entire Propert) 
for S 15.000. 
2-1-. Defendant has been in ti.mnc:d nf the sall! Llf the Pm pert.::, and \\ as requeslt!d to 
attc:nd clo:;ing. h) be h~IJ trn .-\ug.usl I.201-1-. and quitclaim her int~rcsl or the Prnpi:rt.::, 111 
exchange her pro rara share of the sah! prke (being -1-0°0). \\hi~h equals $6.000. 
2 5. Dd~nJant" s pn, rala share n f the :;all.! price is greater than the amount she paid for 
her intl;!resl in the Property at the tax sale plus 12'>.,;, interest. 
26. Di:lend::mt refused tn attend the closing. 
27. Defrndant refused lo sign a quitclaim <.ked lo the purchaser for her interest in the 
Property. 
28. Dd~ndant refused to accept her $6.000 check lt)r her pro rata share of the sale 
price L)f the Property. 
® 
@ 
29. C 161 P. Ll.C has signed a quitclaim deed of its 60% interest in the Properly to 
Plaintiff. 
30. Pursuant w sl!ctinn 59-2-1351.7 nfthe L'tah Cndc and sectitm 16.2th) of the 
REPC. Plaintiff is entitbl t1) speci lie performance f~)I' thl! Det-.:nd:mt tn l'.1)1l\ cy her ta.x sale 
inte1\!sl Ln the Plaintiff in exd1ange for ht!r prn rata share of the Propc:rty ·s purchase pricl:!. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
\\'IIER[FORE. the Plaintiff prays for rdief as folio\\<;: 
I. :\n Lmkr requiring. Ddi:ndant ll) quitdaim her inti:rest in the Property to the 
Plaintiff in exl'.hang.e for her pni rata share of the sak price llf the Prnpe1ty pursuant to st!ction 
59-2-1351. 7 uf the L'tah Codi: and section 16.2( hl of the REPC. 
For attorney· s fees and l'.0::.ts pursua111 tl) section 17 of rhe RLPC. 
~ 
·'. 
For ,,hate\l.!l" further relief this Court deems fair and just. 
D 1·1·· L I . ., 8th d . , I I 
. \ -~ ) t 1Is .;.( a:, ot .. \ugust. _I) -... 
Plaintiff's .-\ddrcss: 
CS0-1-750. LLC 
P.O. Bo\ 971622 
Orem. l'T 8-+097 
Dt RH\ \I .Jo,ES & Pl\'EC; \R, P.C'. 
s Stephen Ouesenbe1-r, 
Stephen C)ucsenbe1-ry 
Kimberly Barnes 
.-1 tlomL:n/iJr Pl,1i11tif /' 
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A-2 
Default Judgment 
STEPHEN QUESENBERRY (8073) 
sqL11.:sl..'nhl..'rn a djpb,, .Cl)l11 
KIMBERLYN. BAR'.'IES (14589) 
kbarnl..'s ci djpla,\ .cnm 
DURHAM, .JONES & PINEGAR, P.C. 
330 I North Thanksgiving Way. Suite -too 
Lehi. Utah 8-W-tJ 
Tdephom:: 801-3 75-6600 
Facsimile: 801-375-3865 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
The Order of Court is stated behm: 
Dated: l\m em her 26. 2014 /s/ James R. Taylor 
12:36:26 P\I District Court Judge 
I~ Tl IE FOLJRT!-1 JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT. UTAH COUNTY 
PROVO DEPART\IENT. STA TE OF UTAH 
C50-P50P. LLC.. a rtah limill:J liability 
company. 
Plaintiff 
VS. 
ST.-\CI B.-\KER. an individual. 
Dd~ndant. 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Cas.: No. 1-H>-tO I 249 
Judg.: Jam.:s R. Taylor 
Pursuant to the Ji:fault .:ntl..'ri:d aguinst Staci Bak.:r l..'ntered on November 12. 201-L 
I. Thc subject prnpe11y located at 161 W. Paci tic Dr .. American Fork. L:T 84003 (the 
··Prope11y .. ) is quieted in C504750P. LLC. fr.:e and dear of any other interests . 
., C50-P50P. LLC. the buyer of the Propaty. must pay Staci Baker her pro rata share of the 
salc pricl! of the Propl!rty ( bl!ing 40°'11 of the S 15.000 sale price). \\ hich l!quals $6.000. 
3. r\s thl! prl!vailing party. thl! Plaintiff is a\\i.lrdcd costs in the amount of $609.20. 
•. B.tsl!d on the Attornl!y· s F.:e Affidavit of Stl!phl!n Qul!scnberry. th.: Plaintiff is awarded 
November 26, 2014 12:36 PM 1 of 3 
attorney· s foes pursuant to section 17 of the Real Estate Purchase Contract at issue in the 
amount of $--1-.517.00. 
5. Staci Baker·s sale proceeds. as set forth in paragraph 2 above. are currently in the 
Pia inti ff s Attorney· s. Durham. Jones & Pinegar" s. trust/escrow account. The foes and 
costs above. totaling 55.1 ~6.20. shall be deducted from said trust/escrow account and 
paid to Plaintiff. The remaining balance of the sale prh.:e. totaling $873.80. shall be paid 
into the registry of the Court. Staci Baker may attain these funds upon presentation of 
this judgment and proper identifo:ation. 
6. Plaintiffs counsel. Durham. Jones & Pinegar. is erititkd to make all transfors or 
transactions from their trust/escn)\v account as anticipated by this order. 
**Executed and entered by the Court as indicated 
by the dak and seal at the top of thl.! first page** 
-----------------------------------------------END OF Of{ D L~ f{ -------------------------------------
NOTICE 
November 26, 2014 12:36 PM 2 of 3 
® 
® 
@ 
Pursuant to Rule 7(t)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. notice of any objection to 
the Order above shall be submitted to the Court and counsel \Vithin seven days at\er service. If 
no such objection is so submitted. the Court may enter this order. 
DA TED this 17th day of November. 2014. 
November 26, 2014 12:36 PM 
DL R11.,~1 Jo:-;Es & P1:'\EG.-\R, P.C. 
Isl Stephen Ouesenberrv 
Stephen Quesenberry 
Kimberly N. Barnes 
.-luorne,vs/or Plaintiff 
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A-3 
Order Denying Relief fro1n Default Judg1nent 
EVA~ SCH:\IL:TZ (3860) 
<.' ,i.-/111w1:: Lt d1('!t1,u:0111 
KnlBERLY N. BAR~ES (U589) 
kht11·11n· u dinla11.co111 
Dl:RHA'.\-t JONES & Pl~EGAR P.C. 
330 l North Thanksgiving Way. Suite -WO 
Lehi. Utah 8-t-0-43 
Tdephone: 801-3 75-6600 
Facsimile: 801-3 75-3865 
.·lllorm:ys/i"· I'lc1i111 i/f 
Thl' Ordl'r of Court is statl'd bl'low: 
Dated: August 21. 2015 /s/ Jami:s R. Taylor 
I 0:27:-U :-\\I District Court Judg~ 
I:\ THE FOLRTH .JLDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, t:TAH COUNTY 
PROVO DEPARTMEI'.T, STATE OF UTAH 
C50-4750P. LLC .. a Utah limited liabilit) 
company. 
Plaintiff. 
VS. 
STACI BAKER. an individual. 
Ddcndant. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
RELIEF FROM DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Case No. 1-1-0-40 l .2-49 
Judge James R. Taylor 
rI I IS .\ L\ I"' rLR came before the Court Dll Jul: 20. 2015 for oral argument on 
Dd~ndant · s \ lotion for Relief From De foult Judgment. Pia inti ff\\ :is n:presented by Evan A. 
Schmutz or Durham Jones & Pinegar. Dd~ndant ,, as repn.:sented by Craig Carlile of Ray 
Quinne: & Nd,eker. 
The Court having re, ie\\ ed the pkadings. papers and t:\ idence filed by the pa11ies. and 
having heard the argument of cmmsel. denied the Defrndant' s 1\h)tion from th~ Bench and. good 
cause appearing. 
August 21, 2015 10:27 AM 1 of 2 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED. ADJUDGED. AND DECREED that: 
Defendant's Motion for Rdief from Default Judgment is denied for the reasons and upon the 
authority and evidem:e set forth in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to the motion. 
**Executed and entered by the Court as indicated by the date and seal at the 
top of the first page** 
---------END OF ORDER---------------
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I herebv certifv that on this I 21h ,.la, of Au!!ust 2015. I eh:ctronicallv filed the foregoing 
.. ... . - ., - ..... 
with the Clerk of the Court using the GreenFiling system which sent notification of such filing to 
the follnwing: 
Craig Carlile 
A.J. Green 
Ray Quinney & Nebeker PC 
86 ~.Jorth l'.ni,ersit) .-\,enue. #-BO 
Prom. Utah 8-1-60 I 
SLC_~-43~1 I~ I 
August 21, 2015 10:27 AM 
's/ Kim Altamirano 
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